Marx's View of Reality and Chinese Road

This article is a phased achievement of the National Social Science Fund's major project “Marxism and the Trend of Contemporary Social Political Philosophy” (Project No. 12ZD106).

Expressed as abstract idealism, or as the same abstract empiricism. Therefore, this thesis attempts to explain the essence of Marx's realistic view through the philosophical path, and explores the ideological basis of understanding the Chinese road on the basis of these essentials.

Marx's view of reality, although influenced by Feuerbach, still has the most essential connection with Hegel's concept of reality. This is not only because Hegel decisively changed the connotation of the concept of reality itself, "his unprecedented promotion of the real, current world to the content of philosophy", but also because Hegel's concept of reality embraces the experience of experience. In the sense of the content, it leads the disintegration of speculative idealism in a certain sense, and restricts the theoretical trend of "reality" after the disintegration. 1 In Hegel's philosophy, the most basic and most concise definition of the concept of reality is expressed as: reality is the unity of essence and reality. This means that “reality” is not only understood as the essence, but also as reality.

The diversity in reality is their truth. "2 If we say that in the previous metaphysics, the real "reality" was only divided into the essential field and separated from the phenomenon field and its diversity, then Hegel's concept of reality is different, it requires Essentially speculatively built into existence. Similarly, in the current opinion of the vulgar, "reality" simply means a simple set of real (ready-made "facts", meaning that it can be directly given in perception. Our things, then Hegel's concept of reality requires that the real world be speculated in the essence. In this sense, unless we can penetrate into the essence, otherwise, reality is impossible. Come and see us; there is no real reality here, at most there is only pure existence. Therefore, in Hegel's logic, the concept of reality belongs to "essence as the unity of essence and reality, "reality" It is also a system of internal and external. In Hegel's view, "in essence, there is existence as existence; the relationship between existence and essence is further formed into a contrast between inside and outside." 3 In the most general sense of this contrast, the inner is the essence, outside Yes, and reality is the direct formation of internal and external. In this sense, the performance of real things is the same as the real thing itself. "So the real thing is still the essential thing in its performance. It can also be said that only when it has direct external reality, the real thing is the essential thing." 4 The concept of reality is in philosophy The significance of the great revolution in history is that the content of philosophy is reality, the content of the world or the experience of reality, and such content is for the philosophy of Karlovite: a revolutionary break from Hegel to Nietzsche’s 19th century thinking. , Li Qiu zero translation, Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 2006, p. 184.

Hegel: The Journal of Logic, translated by Yang Yi, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976, p. 177.

Hegel: Little Logic, He Lin Translated, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1980, p. 295.

It is essential. Therefore, philosophy must be consistent with reality and experience. The highest purpose of philosophy is to confirm the agreement between thought and experience: "It can even be said that the agreement between philosophy and experience can at least be regarded as the external touchstone for testing philosophical truth." As for the great changes and positive consequences of this philosophical content, as long as Hegel's legal philosophy is compared with Kant or Feuerbach's moral philosophy, a general overview can be formed.

More importantly, in Hegel's philosophy, reality is not only the essence and the existence, the internal and external, but also the unfolding process, which is the inevitability expressed in the process of development. This means that reality is truly historic. Engels quoted Hegel's famous saying when comparing the "existing" and "reality" to clarify the fundamental difference between the two. "Reality shows inevitability in the process of its development." 2 This means: reality is not ready-made, stiff. On the contrary, as a whole, reality is a kind of generation relative to the fixed existence of individual things, which is a precondition for things to be proved to be part of the integration process. In a word, the reality is purely historical, and it is always carried out for historical purposes. In this way, as Lukács said, the problem of reality emerged in Hegel's new face: "Generating the truth expressed as being, the process is expressed as the truth of things. This means that historical development The tendency constitutes a higher reality than the empirical facts. ''3 In other words, the reality concept is oriented here not only for generation, process, but especially for things that are inevitable in the process of development. As an essential aspect, inevitability In the understanding of the concept of reality, it immediately leads to a distinction between “reality” and “accidental reality.” 4 When this distinction generally takes reality and just fleeting, When the accidental reality is opened separately, it also distinguishes what is becoming a reality in the historical process from the accidental reality that has lost its inevitability but still exists. It is in the latter meaning that 靡Fest The arguments of Fellers are full of history. 5 It is almost impossible to explain what it is: such a realistic concept for a highly nervous historical

After generalizing the main provisions and essential features of Hegel's concept of reality, it is necessary to further examine the ontological basis of this concept. The question to be investigated here is that Hegel's concept of reality is to build Hegel: Small Logic, p. 43; see also page 53.

Lukács: History and Class Consciousness on Marx's Dialectics, Du Zhangzhi, et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996, pp. 268-269.

See Hegel: Little Logic, p. 44.

With regard to this historicity, Heidegger’s statement is: “Things of thought are historical to Hegel, and this is historical in the sense of events. The process characteristics of events occur by existence. The dialectic determines." (Selected by Sun Zhouxing: Heidegger's Selected Works, Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 1996, p. 822) Based on what the ontological basis is based on, the answer is: such a basis is called absolute idealism. Doctrine. It means: First, the ultimate basis of the so-called reality is absolute, entity, and God. If reality itself contains essential aspects, then the essence of essence is this absolute entity. In this sense, the entity or God, as the ultimate reality, is the only real reality. As Hegel said, in terms of philosophy, it is fixed in general, part is phenomenon, and only part is reality. ''1 Second, this absolute entity should be grasped as the subject at the same time. The primary proposition of psychophenomenology is "absolutely the concept of the subject." According to this concept, “the key to cutting the problem lies in not only understanding and expressing the real thing or truth as an entity, but also understanding and expressing it as the subject.” 2 In this sense, the ontological basis of reality is the absolute subject. . If the subject in general is thoughts, ideas, etc., then the absolute subject is the idea of ​​thinking, the concept of concept, that is, philosophy, reason, and absolute reason. Therefore, the simple proposition in Hegel's philosophy of law "everything that is rational is real; everything that is realistic is rational" 3 is taken for granted. Third, it is precisely in such an ontology that it is because both rationality and reality are based on the absolute absolute rationality. This basis implies the objectivity of thought: thought is not just "our thought" (ie, the rationality of self-consciousness), but also "the self of things" (ie, reality, the existence of reason). Therefore, Hegel constantly criticizes the abstract rationality that separates the idea from the reality, and stipulates the object of philosophy as the idea that the reality of the existing existence. 4 It is not difficult to see that the ontological foundation of such a realistic concept first contains a Platonic step, and it also brings truth, reality or essence into the super-perceive world and belongs to the idea. In such a more general metaphysical framework, the real reality or essence of a thing is that it is more or less "divided". However, for Hegel, reality is not only the essence but also the reality. If the idea is the only ontological basis of reality, then it must not only be the essence of the real thing, but also let the reality as reality. Hegelian philosophy offers this kind of "creation": if Spinoza's entity is a dead entity or "wireless darkness", then the entity as the subject is not only an infinite matrix, but also Unlimited function. Marx once explained the function of this kind of creation in the most shallow comparison: If apples, pears, and strawberries are actually "like entities", then how can the general fruit behave as an apple sometimes as a pear? Or strawberry 昵, "because 'fruit' is not zombie, indifferent, Hegel: Spiritual phenomenology, He Lin, Beijing, Commercial Press, 1979, p. 10.

Hegel: Principles of Legal Philosophy, translated by Zhang Qitai, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1961, p. 11.

The essence of quiescence is a living, self-differentiated, active nature. ''1 as the essence of the "fruit"

Determine yourself as apples, pears, strawberries, etc., and the difference between them is the self-differentiation of "fruits"; these differences make various special fruits become the "fruits of the "fruits" process." In this series The 'fruit' in each link gives itself a more developed and more vivid set, until it is finally a 'general' of all fruits and a living unity. "2 Therefore, in Hegel, because the absolute (entity) is understood as the subject, the internal process and the absolute personality, so the absolute point of view is also the "absolute method." It is not a form without content. The method, but the self-activity of the absolute subject, that is, the process of self-expansion, self-differentiation, and self-regulation of the concept is the dialectic of speculation, that is, the whole embodiment of the self-realization of the concept.

Reality, as the concept of self-realization, is externalized or manifested in the concept of existence, so it is implemented in a dialectic of speculation; this implementation is also the embodiment of reality itself. Here, dialectics means nothing more than the development of reality itself and thus the specific program of thinking to grasp reality. Therefore, in Hegel's view, not only is reality itself specific, but the path of thought deep in reality must also be concrete. On the one hand, "reality, as a specific category, contains the preceding categories and their differences, and therefore is their development. 3 In this regard, reality and inevitability are set, but they are not abstract. Set up, but "the specific things that are done by themselves." On the other hand, the external reflection of abstract thoughts, the intellectuality of form, etc. cannot reach the real reality at all, because such thoughts are completely non-critical and not free. "The idea of ​​true freedom is itself concrete, and it is the idea; and in terms of the universality of thought, it is philosophy or absolute." 4 It is in accordance with the specific program of this realistic concept that Hegel most resolutely opposes subjective thinking and external reflection. As Lukács and Gadamer said, Hegel deliberately struggled with "reflexive philosophy" for a lifetime, and opposed his entire philosophical approach, namely, process and concreteness, dialectics, and history. Therefore, the most distinctive feature of speculative philosophy is the constant and sometimes even harsh criticism of reflective philosophy. Hegel sees pure external reflection as a pathological manifestation of romanticism and its weak nature. 5 Thus, in Hegel, the principle of the foundation and orientation of the most essential essence of the concept of reality is: the absolute concept and its specific program. Just as “reality” is the basis of its ontology in absolute ideas, he is also essentially oriented in the process of speculation. It is because of this foundation and orientation that Hegel often makes a narrative of grasping the real thing in the speculative narrative. This kind of exposition in the speculative elaboration will induce the reader to speculate. Explain as Lukaqi: History and Class Consciousness on Marx's Dialectics, p. 67; Gadamer: Reality''. 1 Marx's view of reality first manifests itself as an ontology of Hegel's concept of reality Criticism, more holistically speaking, manifests itself as a critical separation from Hegel's speculative philosophy. Such an ontological critique was originally inspired and influenced by Feuerbach, and this kind of inspiration and influence is indeed Not insignificant.

Essentially important to Marx's view of reality is that Feuerbach has literally subverted Hegel's concept of reality on the ontology. Reality is by no means an "incarnation" in the realm of the essence of ideas, just as Hegel once called emotions, beliefs or representations, etc., the "incarnation" of thinking.

The same is true; 2 the scale of real things is first of all perceptual reality, and as a perceptual reality, "reality" directly manifests itself as what it is. In a word, reality is not the idea of ​​projection in reality, but directly the existence of sensibility. One of the "great feats" that Marx cited in the economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844 is: "He denies the affirmation of something based on himself and actively based on himself and the self-proclaimed thing that is absolutely certain. Negation is opposite. '3 Here, the former refers to the direct perceptual reality, and the latter refers to the speculative reality of the intermediary. Therefore, when Feuerbach opposes the two, this opposition means reality. The true essence is that if we can talk about "essence" here, it is sensibility, not the inevitability expressed in the process of speculative thinking. The reality is perceptual and concrete, and it is never reflected in the concreteness of speculative thinking. Feuerbach It is claimed that Hegel’s dialectic of perceptual certainty discards the actual and individual “one” in the things of general logic, and makes the latter the truth of the former; but in the true sense, the latter is only a word, and Only the former is a thing. Therefore, the secret of existence does not show the thinking of the general, but the intuitiveness, feeling and lust of the sensibility; only Therefore, love means that an object exists outside our mind. The true ontology proves that there is no other proof of existence other than love. "4 Feuerbach's principle of reality, which is oriented by perceptuality and objectivity (objectivity means the reality of the perceptual subject), is not only specific to Hegelian philosophy, but generally to the whole philosophy of metaphysics, ie Platonism. The form in which philosophy is completed is Hegel's "speculative theology", because metaphysics has given itself theological nature from the beginning. The fundamental establishment of philosophical metaphysics lies in: (1) the perceptual world ( The metaphysical world is strictly separated from and opposed to the super-perceived world (the metaphysical); (2) the reality, the truth, or the essence is only attributed to the super-sensing world rather than to the perceptual world; (3) if it is in the perceptual world Things can be called reality in a certain sense, just because they "divide" the idea of ​​a super-sense world. Therefore, just as in theology, super-sensing things (God) are realistic and infinite. The sensible things are unrealistic and finite. In philosophy, super-sensible reasoning makes sensible things in an abstract way. 1 In this sense, Feuerbach highlights reality as sensibility, thus opposing the metaphysical super-sensing world of philosophy as a whole. "As God of God, God as a spiritual entity or an abstract entity, that is, a non-human, non-sensible entity that can only be accepted as rational or rational and as an object of reason, is nothing else, but the essence of reason. Self.” 2 Feuerbach’s philosophical foundation and orientation of the principle of “reality” not only fundamentally reversed Hegel’s concept of reality, but also violently attacked the philosophy of metaphysics from the ontological foundation. Basic establishment. This reversal and attack is not only shocking, but also profound (only the later metaphysical critics such as Kierkegaard, Stirner, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, etc.). All in all, in Feuerbach's philosophical standpoint, the essence of reality and thus reality is not the idea of ​​the super-perceived world, God or speculative thinking, but the directness of direct sensibility or sensibility.

Although this kind of opposition seems to be related to the theme of "reality", since Hegel emphasizes that reality is the only content of philosophy, the disagreement about "reality" has actually become a philosophical struggle. Around the pivot of the rotation. 3 The original construction of Marx's concept of reality originated from the critique of Hegel's philosophy of law, and this critique meant that he began to enter the "general problem of Feuerbach" and adopted a general agreement with Feuerbach. Critical pace. The core of this critical step is to guide the essence of “reality” into the perceptual existence, rather than to the spiritual entity or the speculative idea. The theme of Hegel's philosophy of law is social reality, that is, the existence and essence of society. But this kind of reality is how to be grasped. We take the "ethics" part as an example: this part is divided into three parts, namely, family, civil society and country. In Hegel's view, the abandoned family and civil society are the state, so the state is the true essence and reality of the family and civil society. In other words, just as the real nature of the state is the same as the concept of the state, the concept of the state finds its true philosophical proof in the pure form of absolute concept (in this sense, “the whole legal philosophy is merely a supplement to logic” 4 ). Therefore, Marx’s critique of the concept of Hegel's reality on the subject of legal philosophy has two prominent aspects. First, Hegel's understanding of reality is purely upside down on the ontology. The relationship between reality (the relationship between family and civil society) is called phenomenon, and the essential or real see now Karlovett: a revolutionary break from Hegel to Nietzsche's 19th century thinking, 188, 184 page.

Reality is attributed to the concept (national concept, absolute concept). This means: “The concept becomes the subject, and the relationship between the family and the civil society to the reality of the state is understood as the inner imagination of the concept. The family and the civil society are the premise of the state, and they are truly active; In the speculative thinking, this is reversed. However, if the concept becomes the subject, then the subject of reality, civil society, family, 'situation, arbitrary, etc.' becomes the unreality of the concept here, and The objective factor of meaning." 1 Marx imitated Feuerbach, calling this concept of reality a logical, pantheistic mysticism. Second, because Hegel interprets reality as a contradictory movement with speculative thinking as its essence, he regards the process of development, historicality and concreteness of reality as speculative sublation, rational reasoning, and extreme opposites. Intermediary process.

On the contrary, in Marx's view, reality itself contains extreme opposites and the process of unfolding from it, but just as the extreme nature of reality never stays in simple thinking, such extremes are never possible. Reconcile through the reasoning or mediation process of speculative thinking. For example, the extremes of the real reality of the society in the civil society are not just the opposition in the mind, and therefore it is impossible to solve, discard, and reconcile only through the ascending movement of speculative reasoning and mediation. "It is worth noting that Hegel attributed this absurdity of mediating to its abstract logic and thus can be described as non-fictional and uncontested. At the same time, it also describes this mediating role as a logical speculation. The mystery is a rational relationship and a rational reasoning. 2 In terms of the ontological critique of Hegel's legal philosophy, Marx maintains a general orientation with Feuerbach. The essential aspect of "reality" is not the concept, rationality, and speculative thinking, but the direct sensibility of reality is first of all sensibility. The consequences of such a realistic view in the course of the criticism of legal philosophy are: (1) the essence of social existence is not in the state and the concept of the state; (2) on the contrary, the essence of the concept of state lies in the country of existence. And the essence of the state lies in the existential society; therefore, (3) the key to all the problems is: where should we discover the essence of social existence, in other words, if the current real society is "civil society "How should we explore the essence of this social reality and grasp the true "social reality"? It is this major fundamental issue that has opened Marx's political economics criticism. For Marx, political economy is a science that has matured and is completely civil society, both in terms of its nature and its content. Therefore, the essence cannot be readily provided by the “political economics” as intellectual science, but can only be revealed by the exact “criticism of political economy”.

It is precisely because the problem here is fundamentally related to the understanding of “social reality”, that is, the essential understanding of social reality, so when Marx began his initial critique of political economy in 1844, this A critique is immediately expressed as a re-criticism of the completed metaphysics (Hegelian philosophy).

point. This re-criticism, which was restarted by Marx himself, is directly related to the reconstruction of "social reality." It not only means that the critique of political economy must become a philosophical critique at the same time. If there is no corresponding philosophical criticism, it is impossible to criticize the deepening of political reality in social economics; it also means: in order to reconstruct the reality of society. Really understand that Feuerbach's philosophical criticism and its preliminary principles of reality seem to be inadequate and inadequate. Although Marx may not have been very aware of this at the time, his reopening of the criticism of Hegel's dialectics itself fully demonstrates the absolute necessity of this criticism. 1 indicates how the concept of reconstructing social reality is for him. Fundamentally, it is necessary to establish a fundamental relationship with Hegelian philosophy. Therefore, what needs to be further clarified is: In the intricate relationship with Feuerbach and Hegel, how Marx's view of reality gradually achieves a basic orientation through a double critique, and finally obtains a decisive foundation.

For Marx's view of reality, it is crucial that when he still relied on Feuerbach in 1844 and launched a fierce ontological critique of Hegel's dialectics, he was already on the subject of reality. Beginning to "subtlely" criticize Feuerbach. This initial or potential criticism will soon prove how it becomes the essential aspect and powerful driving force of Marx's reconstruction of reality. As mentioned earlier, one of the main points that Marx called Feuerbach's great merits is that Feuerbach opposes the directness of sensibility and the negative interrogation process of the absolute person, that is, the denial of negation. This undoubtedly means that Marx is in reality. The aspect of the initial agreement with Feuerbach is that reality is first and foremost emotional. But one important question that remains to be solved is: how to understand the negation of the negation that claims to be absolutely positive. It is on this issue that Marx’s understanding of reality begins to surpass Feuerbach. The decisive pace. In Feuerbach, where the negation of negation is merely regarded as the contradiction between philosophy and itself, that is, pure illusion, Marx interprets it as the "abstract, logical, speculative expression" of the historical movement, 2 Metaphysically changed the historical reality of the costume. In other words, Feuerbach regards the truth of denial as merely a contradiction of philosophy, as a pure embarrassment, and thus nothing but "nothing" and Marx grasps its truth as a metaphysical disguise. The reality of reality is the unfolding process, the historical movement, and the dialectical embodiment, even though such reality is completely under the mysticism of speculative philosophy. Therefore, the following assertions of the Paris manuscript are logical: the phenomenology of Hegels, 823, and the final result of dialectics, the greatness of the negation of the principle of promotion and creation, first and foremost, black Geer regards human self-generation as a process, regards objectification as non-objectification, and regards externalization and the sublation of such externalization; it can be seen that he grasps the essence of labor and puts the object of humanity and reality. Therefore, the real person understands the result of his own labor. 1 Thus, the principle of "activity" is a fully developed principle in German classical philosophy, especially in Hegelian philosophy, in the realistic view of the Paris manuscript. As the root seedlings are unstoppable, this root seedling, as the initial but essentially important difference with Feuerbach's view of reality, not only becomes a powerful component of Marx's view of reality, but also contains criticism of Feuerbach. The basic reason.

Therefore, when we see the philosophical transformation based on practice as the fundamental orientation in the follow-up of Feuerbach's outline and German ideology, Marx's view of reality has been firmly established in "perceptual activities" or "objects." The ontological foundation of sexual activity. Reality, for Marx, is not just a direct emotional object of sensibility. Rather, it is a perceptual object that is generated, expanded, correlated, and thus embodied in perceptual activities. As Lovett said, "The existence of society in Marx shows the emotional activity as a social practice." 2 In this sense, Marx's view of reality is also a concept of practice. Because the principle of activity is decisively grasped in the sensibility Therefore, Marx’s understanding of reality immediately manifests itself as the unfolding process of reality, manifested in the historical nature of things, manifested in the concreteness of the existence of the connected reality. This seems to be the return to Hegel’s philosophy, but two The fundamental difference between the two is that Hegel's concept of reality is based on absolute ideas (thinking thinking) and the specific program that is oriented from it; and Marx's view of reality is based on perceptual activities (practice), and This is the specific program of orientation. These two specific programs can be called dialectics, but according to Marx himself, they are "the opposite."

This fundamental difference is prominently reflected in Marx's following proposition: "Consciousness can only be realized at any time, and people's existence is their real life process." '3 precisely because of this ontology The decisive change, Marx was able to grasp the reality as: (1) reality is not the product of the self-activity of the idea, but directly the process of people's real life; just because of the life process through this emotional activity, the human existence and thus the society The reality of reality becomes a real reality. (2) Social reality is not only real, but also the essence of this essence is not in the concept, concept, speculative thinking, but directly in the process of people's emotional life. The universal is the mode of production. "It is the way in which these individuals are determined to be, the way they express their lives, and their certain way of life. "4 This essential aspect of social existence is called by Gadamer as "the production relationship of the basic structure of human society", Karlovy Viter: a revolutionary break from Hegel to Nietzsche's 19th century thinking, p. 188.

Heidegger called it “economic development and the structure needed for such development.” 1 (3) Therefore, social reality is essentially a structural entity, and the overall structure is a history. The whole (change structure of production methods) is just like the existence of any kind of human beings or the existence of society is defined in the overall structure of its structure and thus gains meaning. Such existence is only in the overall history of its existence. Generated and changed as a deployment process. In Marx’s view, the single isolated individual atomic individual who left the former and was regarded as the starting point, “the fictitious fiction of the 18th century” left the latter, and formed the social reality in “and The pure illusion of "the history of eternal natural law that has nothing to do with history." 2(4) Just as social reality itself is completely concrete in its structure-history of the whole to achieve its comprehensive concrete example, the true understanding and grasp of social reality must therefore become concrete; that is, unless it It has a comprehensive and concrete program that plays a fundamental role. Otherwise, there is no way to touch the reality, let alone grasp the substantive content of reality itself. When Marx talked about the method of political economy, he outlined this specific program, but it was largely shelved, misunderstood and forgotten. Marx pointed out that the scientifically correct method lies in: "The specific reason is concrete, because it is the synthesis of many regulations, and thus the unity of diversity. Therefore, it manifests itself in a comprehensive process of thinking, as a result, not as a manifestation. The starting point, although it is the starting point of reality, is also the starting point of visualization and representation. On the first road, the complete representation evaporates into an abstract rule; on the second road, the abstraction rules lead to specific in the thinking journey. Reproduction. 3 The whole concrete program of Marx's view of reality contains two paths at the same time: it starts from the specificity of sensibility, and through the abstraction of thinking, it is specific to the mind (with many rules and relationships). Rich overall).

From this we immediately see how far Marx’s view of reality is from Feuerbach. Although the principle of perceptual reality has greatly inspired and promoted Marx, since Feuerbach only understands reality as a perceptual direct "sensible object" rather than a "sensible activity", the reality of reality is only a display. Give simple feelings and simple intuitiveness. In such a sensibility of directness, the so-called reality is almost purely perceptual reality, that is, something that can be directly given to us through feeling or intuition, without including anything truly essential; so that Feuerbach The essence of reality can't say anything of value, or when he wants to talk about this essential aspect, he has to rethink the illusion of speculation. 4 The most important thing is that this theoretical situation completely excludes the process of development, history and materialization from reality, thus completely shrinking the understanding of reality in the appearance of chaos, or ending in the nameless, but It is also abstract in the intuitive. This not only makes the social reality a completely “unreachable area” of Feuerbach, but also makes the “natural” reality only stay in the intuitiveness of the natural science that has usurped the reality. 5 Therefore, it is by Gadamer: Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 114.

The principle of activity, the historicality of the process, and the program of concreteness have all been abolished, so Feuerbach’s philosophy has shown an incredible poverty in the realm of social reality, even as Lovett said, it is a kind of “regression”. "The brutalization of thinking that replaces content with exaggeration and intention. 1 Therefore, in a nutshell, the great revolutionary significance of Marx's view of reality is that it does not depend on the absolute God or the mysterious "the subject and the guest", but completely from the sensibility The world of a perceptual activity, to grasp the reality, to expound the essence of reality. Such an essentiality exists, and it is also a universal person who plays a decisive role in the process of development or the specific itinerary;的普遍者既不是理智的抽象规定，也不是被神秘化为”实体“的思辨的思维，②而是广义的生产方式或生活方式，是这种生活方式的变动结构。马克思的现实观从根本上构成唯物史观的实质。它的影响是如此的广泛而深远，以至于虽然存在着主要由实证主义定向 误解和偏差，但”自此之后，这种历史观也规定着非马克思主义者和反马克思主义者的思维方式，甚至超出他们想知道的程度。他们都要像马克思那样把握'现实的生活过程'和并非无前提、而是恰恰相反也是思维方式的前提条件的定生活方式'.③至于马克思现实观的深刻之处，海德格尔评论说：马克思在体会到异化的时候，是深入到“历史的本质性的度”中去了，因此其历史观比其他的历史学来得优越。看来胡塞尔和萨特，从现象学和存在主义都没有能够达到历史事物的本质性；只有达到了那一度，才可能有资格和马克思主义对话。在另一处，海氏又说：“现今的哲学”只是跟在知性科学后面亦步亦趋，却完全不了解我们这个时代的两重独特的现实，即经济发展以及这种发展所需要的架构。 ⑤只有从社会现实的立场出发，才可能真正理解“中国道路”

一一无论这道路在实践上的具体展开，还是这一道路在思维中得以再现的理论方法。这里所谓的中国道路，是指中国自近代以来在其历史性实践中所开辟出来并形成起来的发展道路。只要我们试图由社会现实本身去把握中国道路，那就根本无法规避或越过马克思的现实观。因为任何规避或越过这种现实观的企图，在关于中国道路的言说或判断方面，都已经或即将被证明是与真正的社会现实分离隔绝的，并因而在理论上终究是非批判的和无头脑的。这里的问题始终关涉到中国的社会现实一一它的实体性内容一一是否得到切近的理解和把握，正像问题的关键始终关涉卡尔洛维特：从黑格尔到尼采19世纪思维中的革命性决裂，第107页。

参见卡尔洛维特：从黑格尔到尼采19世纪思维中的革命性决裂，第127页注1中，洛维特的说法：“他之所以针对费尔巴哈捍卫黑格尔，乃是因为黑格尔理解普遍者的决定性意义；而他之所以攻击黑格尔，乃是因为黑格尔在哲学上把历史的普遍关系神秘化了。”

卡尔洛维特：从黑格尔到尼采19世纪思维中的革命性决裂，第134―135页。

参见孙周兴选编：海德格尔选集上卷，第383页。

到“现实”本身作为本质与实存的统是否在哲学上得到批判的澄清样。只有当社会现实的哲学立场以及中国社会的现实内容被牢牢地装进能思的和批判的意识之中，理解中国道路的可靠途径才有可能被实际地开辟出来。这一点无论是对于一般的知性社会科学来说，还是对于马克思主义的理论或学术来说，都不能不是至关重要的。

四在形成对中国道路的理解和把握时，马克思的现实观是否可能存在着巨大的思想障碍昵，是的，其中最严重的障碍就是“外部反思”。所谓外部反思，从哲学上来说，就是一种“忽此忽彼地活动着的推理能力”，它从来不会驻足并深入于特定的实体性内容之中；但它知道一般原则，而且知道把一般原则运用到任何内容之上。外部反思并不是我们所不熟悉的罕见的东西，恰好相反，它实在是我们在日常意识中尤其是在知识界中经常碰到的。简单说来，外部反思就是教条主义（或哲学上的形式主义），因为教条主义所知道的就是把一般原则抽象地运用到任何内容之上。例如，在中国革命时期，“左倾教条主义”就是外部反思的典型代表。他们留苏回来，一口流利的俄语，马恩列的经典倒背如流，对俄国的经验也是崇拜到五体投地。他们由此主张中国革命的根本之举就是中心城市武装起义。但结果又怎样昵，结果是一次次极为惨痛的失败。在经历了诸多教训和探索之后，中国共产党人终于摆脱了外部反思的主观思想，终于发现中国的事情和中国的道路决不仅仅从属于一般的抽象原则。植根于中国社会现实基础之中的革命路径不是中心城市武装起义，而是农村包围城市只是从这里才开始形成所谓的中国问题和中国经验，才开展出真正的中国道路。

需要强调的是，虽说有过这样的前车之鉴，但在今天中国的知识界和社会科学界，并不需要太费周折就能发现：那种仅仅知道把一般原则抽象地运用到任何内容之上的外部反思依然盛行，甚至比当时教条主义的马克思主义有过之而无不及。只不过那时的教条主要来自于俄国，而今天的教条主要来自于西方。可以说，外部反思根本不可能形成对中国道路的真正理解，因为它严重地遮蔽了社会现实，因为它实际上是以抹杀和阉割社会的实体性内容与差别为前提的。外部反思作为主观思想之最集中和最广泛的现代表现，不仅与马克思的现实观背道而驰，而且实际上退行到了黑格尔以前。

正是在这里，重新显示出黑格尔的可取之处。“黑格尔哲学通过对主观意识观点进行清晰的批判，开辟了一条理解人类社会现实的道路，而我们今天仍然生活在这样的社会现实中。①在黑格尔看来，外部反思属于最为庸浅浮薄的主观思想，也就是诡辩论的现代形式；它非常恰当地把仅仅知道外部反思的人叫做”门外汉“。

这意味着：只要我们从主观思想及其外部反思出发，社会现实就必然遗失在我们的视野之外，从而对“中国道路”的现实理解就是根本不可能的。黑格尔曾多次提到，现实不仅是客观的，而且是强有力的，它自己为自己开辟道路。“但惯于运用理智的人特别喜欢把理念与现实分离开，他们把理智的抽象作用所产生的梦想当成真实可靠，以命令式的'应当'自夸，并且尤其喜欢在政治领域中去规定切把现实及其内容统统打发掉之后，这个世界似乎就只能听凭主观任意的”应当“来为它开辟道路了。

对于“中国道路”的领会和阐述在多大程度上屈从于外部反思以及由之而来的主观命令（应当），它也就在多大程度上脱离具有实体性内容的社会现实。根据马克思的现实观，“历史科学”的全部任务和唯一目的就在于把握这样的社会现实。为此而需要的是：（1）科学的抽象；（2）由科学的抽象深入到现实中去的整个具体化纲领；（3）由这样的具体化纲领来定向的“实证研究”。对于牵涉到“中国道路”的主题而言，最关重要的是第二项，即深入到社会现实中去的具体化纲领。因为，如果缺失这个本质重要的中项，“科学的抽象”就足以为外部反思大开方便之门，而所谓例。当我们说用唯物史观的基本原理来研究中国道路时，必须首先十分清楚地把握这些原理的一般性质。例如，关于历史之现实前提的原理、经济基础决定上层建筑的原理，以及历史道路之“三阶段”或“五阶段”的原理等等，其基本性质究竟是怎样的，回答是：它们是一些科学的抽象。因此，这些抽象对于研究来说是非常重要的；但也因此，若脱离了探入现实的具体化纲领及其在实证研究中的贯彻，它们就只能是些空疏的和无内容的形式。关于这一点，马克思和恩格斯是明确地并且一再加以强调的。“对现实的描述会使独立的哲学失去生存环境，能够取而代之的充其量不过是从对人类历史发展的考察中抽象出来的最一般的结果的概括。这些抽象本身离开了现实的历史就没有任何价值。它们只能对整理历史资料提供某些方便，指出历史资料的各个层次的顺序。它们绝不提供可以适用于各个历史时代的药方或公式。”③同样，在政治经济学批判导言中，马克思在谈到生产般时说：所谓切生产的般条件，不过是这些抽象要素，用这些要素不可能理解任何个现实的历史的生产阶段。①对于这些随处可见的论述不必再行列举和解释了它们非常清晰地表明了科学抽象的基本性质。

为了理解和把握中国道路，当然需要这些科学的抽象；但马克思的现实观所标明的这些抽象的性质，却要求我们最坚决地防止其转变为外部反思的抽象原则（药方或公式）。例如，马克思把经济的社会形态演进世界历史道路大体概述为：亚细亚的、古代的、封建的和现代资产阶级的生产方式。但这一概述就其性质而言，决不可以被当作外部反思的原则无条件地运用到任何内容之上。如果是这样的话，把握中国道路简直就比解个次方程都要容易了。值得思考的是：马克思在19世纪40年代研究德国时，从来没有认为德国会直接走英法的道路，尽管英法在当时是走在前列的；他甚至认为，德国解放道路的“可能性”是从它走英法道路的“不可能性”中产生的，②因为德国道路就其社会现实的基础而言，乃是非常独特的。同样值得思考的是，马克思后来在给国纪事的信和给查苏利奇的复信中谈到“俄国道路”时明确指出：资本论关于原始积累的那一章只是描述“西欧的资本主义经济制度”从其先前的经济制度（封建主义）产生出来的途径，因此决不能把这一关于西欧资本主义起源的历史概述转变为“一般发展道路的历史哲学理论”

这种理论以为，一切民族无论其所处的历史环境如何，“都注定要走这条道路。这是全然荒谬的之所以荒谬，是因为这种历史哲学理论是”超历史的③也就是说，它是与社会现实及其历史内容截然分离的、因而只能导致外部反思之先验使用的抽象图式。

于是，对中国道路的真正把握便把我们引向马克思现实观的具体化纲领。只有当科学的抽象被以社会现实为定向的具体化纲领所全面贯彻时，这种必要的抽象才不致成为外部反思的恶劣教条；只有当一个特定社会的实体性内容能够本质上进入到历史科学的综合理解中时，以社会现实为定向的具体化纲领才开始得到真正的贯彻。因此，某一社会现实的内容能否在理解中实际地出现并得到切近的把握，可以被看做是具体化纲领是否得到实施的试金石。在这里得到提示的不仅是这一具体化纲领本身的重要性，而且是由这一纲领开启出具体研究的重要性。这意味着，为了真正理解“中国道路”，就必须使中国社会的现实内容在科学的具体化过程中充分开展并得到把握。前面说过，马克思关于现实的具体化纲领包含着社会一历史之双重的具体化，而这种具体化的整个行程一一与黑格尔不同，也与科学的表述方法不同一一首先是由现实的、特定的对象或对象领域为开端的。马克思把这种“现实的起点”称为实在、主体或实在主体。这样的主体或实在主体在马克思那里主要是“社一16页。

会“即”现代资产阶级社会“它当然也可以是”古代希腊社会“或”当代中国社会“等等。重要的是，这样的实在主体是”既与的“（现译”既定的''），亦即被给定的。由于实在主体在头脑之外保持着它的独立性，所以在理论方法上特定的社会也必须始终作为前提浮现在表象面前。①因此，马克思现实观的具体化纲领立即具有这样一种方法论意义：“在研究经济范畴的发展时，应当时刻把握住：无论在现实中或在头脑中，主体这里是现代资产阶级社会都是既定的；因而范畴表现这个一定社会即这个主体的存在形式、存在规定、常常只是个别的侧面”。②在这里，“现实的起点”对于理解中国道路来说是至关重要的，因为它已先行指定了由实在主体即特定的、既与的社会来制定方向的具体化。

在这一具体化的展开行程中，最关本质的要义乃是把握“实在主体”或既与社会的特殊性，亦即其特定的实体性内容。如果说外部反思的抽象理智只是抹杀任何一种特殊性，那么具体化纲领恰恰就是深入到特殊的现实之中并将这种特殊反映在思维之具体的再现中。特殊性只是在差别中显示出来，正像中国道路的特殊性只是在与他国道路的差别中显示出来一样。没有差别，就没有联系和发展，就没有任何一种具体化。所以“差别的内在发生”以及由差别来规定的特殊性就成为思辨辩证法最关本质的东西。“在普遍性里，思维得到自身的满足，但假如思维对于特殊性采取漠视态度，从而思维对于它自身的发展，也就采取漠视态度了。”③同样，在马克思看来，虽说语言的一般规律和规定是存在的，但构成语言发展的恰恰是有别于这个般和共同点的差别。生产也是如此：“对生产般适用的种种规定所以要抽出来，也正是为了不致因为有了统一而忘记本质的差别。

那些证明现存社会关系永存与和谐的现代经济学家的全部智慧，就在于忘记这种差别。“④因此，对于中国道路的切近把握，只有在科学的抽象能够深入到本质的差别和特殊的内容之中时，也就是说，使之在独特的社会一历史规定中实现其全面的具体化时，才是真正可能的。没有以社会现实为定向的具体化，所谓中国道路就是完全未被理解甚或完全不可理解的。黑格尔在法哲学原理和历史哲学中都曾讲到，拿破仑想要把法国的自由制度先验地强加给西班牙人，结果把事情弄得塌糊涂一一他是不能不失败的。在这里确实有必要就社会现实之差别与特殊性去思考的问题是：法国和西班牙的社会一历史差别有多大，中国和西方的社会一历史差别有多大，并且进一步去思考：如果我们或者公开、或者隐蔽地想要把西方的道路（以及由之而来的种种制度）先验地强加给中国人，这在何种意义上以及在何种程度上是可能的，我们在这里不可能就问题给出完整的答案，黑格尔：小逻辑，第53页；另参见第55页。

因为这样的答案只有在具体化纲领得到充分展开的时候才会真正出现。但具体化纲领本身已经能够提示的是：“如果要先验地给一个民族以一种国家制度，即使其内容多少是合乎理性的，这种想法恰恰忽视了个因素，这个因素使国家制度成为不仅仅是个思想上的事物而已。所以每个民族都有适合于它本身而属于它的国家制度。”①最后，在马克思那里，以社会现实来定向的具体化纲领要贯彻并落实到对实在主体或既与对象的实证研究之中。之所以如此，是因为对马克思来说，现实的本质性不在理念世界中，而在人们的现实生活过程中；现实的特殊性也不是源自理念世界之“差别的内在发生”，而是源自“实在主体”本身之感性活动及活动方式等等的本质差别。因此，马克思现实观具体化纲领不是已经在理念中完成自身的实体之外化的过程，而是通过对实在主体的研究和描述使之被构成的过程。这意味着，除非这样的研究和描述得以展开和实施，否则的话，以社会现实为定向的具体化就转变为它的对立物，也就是说，转变为某种单纯形式的或思辨的抽象物。所以，在马克思、恩格斯看来，“科学的抽象”决不意味着终止对实在主体的研究以及由之而来的困难；相反，只是当我们面对实在主体并试图真正描述现实时，困难才开始出现。“这些困难的排除受到种种前提的制约，这些前提在这里是根本不可能提供出来的，而只能从对每个时代的个人的现实生活过程和活动的研究中产生。”②在这个意义上，如果我们的既与对象是“中国道路”，如果我们试图从社会现实方面去把握并从而向着未来筹划这一道路，那就必须深入地研究中国社会，研究它的历史、独特性和当代处境。

因此，从社会现实的角度对独特的中国社会作出更加深入、更加具体的研究和阐述，乃是项重要而紧迫的任务。可以通过一个例子来说明：在专注于“现实”的中国社会研究中，我们对中国道路的理解会发生怎样的变迁与深化。时下有不少“假设历史”的主观想法，其中的一种观点说，国民党在大陆的失败是军事失败。军事失败的意思是什么昵，意思是说：它既不是政治失败，也不是社会失败，而只不过是极为偶然的军事失败。但如果我们试图从社会现实方面去把握中国革命的历史进程，立即就会意识到这种说法实在是太过肤浅了。现实性是本质的东西，是在展开过程中的必然性；就此应当把握的问题是：中国的现代化事业何以必须通过一场社会革命来为其奠基，而这一社会革命又何以最终取得新民主主义一社会主义的基本定向，费正清在写伟大的中国革命（1800― 1985）时，是体会到某种特别地属于中国道路的东西了。他写道，杜威当年访问中国时对他的学生胡适说，军阀和现代教育不可能并行不悖。这个说法当然不错，但费正清接着写道，我研究中国革命得出的结论是：美国的自由主义和中国革命不可能并行不悖；对于中国革命来说，中国人所需要的不是杜威的教义，而是某种别的东西。①由此可以追问的是：这种别的东西是什么，它对中国革命的进程及其基本定向起了何种作用，不消说，这样的问题最关本质地牵涉到中国道路在展开过程中的必然性；同样不消说，这样的问题只有在实际地研究当时的中国社会并通过具体化而切中其独特现实的情况下才可能找到真正的答案。因此，马克思的现实观不仅构成唯物史观的思想核心，而且开展出把握特定社会现实的三重境域，即科学的抽象、具体化的纲领以及对实在主体的研究；唯在这三重境域的综合理解中，对“中国道路”之真正现实的理论把握和实践筹划才可能被积极地开启出来。

〔责任编辑：李潇潇责任编审：李放〕参见费正清：伟大的中国革命（1800―1985），刘尊棋译，北京：世界知识出版社，

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